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THE WILDERNESS ACT AND THE COURTS
H. ANTHONY RUCKEL"
[Wilderness areas] are delicate, sensitive places where the often
mysterious and unpredictable process of nature [is] to be preserved
for the study and enjoyment of mankind. Congress directed that man
must tread lightly in these areas, in awe and with respect.'
September 3, 1964:
In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by ex-
panding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and
modify all areas within the United States and its possessions, leaving
no lands designated for preservation and protection in their natural
condition, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to se-
cure for the American people of present and future generations the
benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness. For this purpose there
is hereby established a National Wilderness Preservation System....
[Flederally owned areas designated by Congress as "wilderness ar-
eas," . . . shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the
American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for
future use and enjoyment as wilderness .... 2
INTRODUCTION
Thirty-five years! Enough time for courts to establish some clear
interpretive trends for the Wilderness Act. Most fundamentally, they
have recognized a classification of lands reserved and dedicated to a
preservation purpose, as opposed to more traditional resource commodity
purposes, and they have vigorously defended the wilderness quality of
those lands from many challenges. They have also had to balance wilder-
ness preservation with conflicting use exceptions contained in the Wil-
derness Act itself or in enabling legislation for individual wilderness ar-
eas. Again, wilderness principles and objectives have come off rather well.
Naturally, legislation of this significance will always be tested in
court, and many chapters will be written in the future. I have arranged my
discussion of existing case law in a manner which I feel comfortably ad-
dresses the issues litigated. I find three broad categories or themes: the
definition of wilderness, the scope or breadth of protection afforded by the
Act, and management questions regarding wilderness areas themselves.
* Attorney; general practice, environmental law. Founded Rocky Mountain Office, Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund in 1972 and served as director for 13 years.
1. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40,43 (DD.C. 1987) (Gesell, J.).
2. Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 2(a), 78 Stat. 890, 890 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994)).
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I. DEFINITION OF WILDERNESS
The first question is what constitutes wilderness? What kind of land,
precisely, is wilderness? By what values may it be recognized? The op-
erable statutory language is the long definition set forth in section 2(c) of
the Act:
(c) "Wilderness" defined. A wilderness.., is... an area where the
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man.... [It] is
further defined... [as] an area... retaining its primeval character
and influence without permanent improvements or human habitation,
which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural condi-
tions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily
by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially
unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a
primitive and unconfined type of recreation .... .
The first reported case focusing on the definition of wilderness,
Parker v. United States,4 addressed the presence of a road leading into
proposed wilderness, and whether that disqualified the area for inclusion
in a wilderness review and recommendation The court determined that
East Meadow Creek "seems to have significant wilderness resources and
could be determined by the President to be predominately of wilderness
value," that outside of the road, "the area in question is untrammeled by
man," and that "the testimony indicated that due to the dense forest con-
ditions, this road is substantially unnoticeable from approximately 100
yards away." The court went on to note:
East Meadow Creek has outstanding opportunities for solitude and a
primitive and unconfined type of recreation .... [Tihis region is sig-
nificantly interrelated with the Gore Primitive Area. [The road] serves
as an access route .... [Bloth regions are inhabited by deer and
elk.... [D]estruction of the natural state of East Meadow Creek
might have an adverse effect on this wildlife .... [I]t is desirable to
have both alpine and sub-alpine zones within a wilderness area.
In conclusion, we hold that the East Meadow Creek region
meets the minimum requirements of suitability for wilderness classi-
7fication ....
Other courts have spoken in a similar vein. "[T]he term 'wilder-
ness,' as used by Congress, is a technical term which serves to classify
areas containing primitive characteristics."' The district court in Utah
3. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
4. 309F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971).
5. See Parker, 309 F. Supp. at 596.
6. Id. at 601.
7. Id.
8. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 401 F. Supp. 1276, 1330 (D. Minn.
1975), rev'don other grounds, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976).
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faced the difficult question of access to exempted land over other land
being reviewed for potential wilderness. The court found that access
could be regulated as to location and mode in order to protect wilderness
characteristics, and cited the statute for the following: "The definition of
wilderness... contemplates that some human activity can take place in
wilderness areas as long as the area, 'generally appears to have been af-
fected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work
substantially unnoticeable."' For example, Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n v. Peterson' noted that a closed-off road track incapable
of being traversed by non-four-wheel drive vehicles and not maintained
by the Forest Service, which over time would be overgrown with vegeta-
tion, may not disqualify an area for wilderness classification."
The courts have adopted a practical definition, recognizing the
primitive, untrammeled nature of wilderness, but acknowledging the
often unavoidable presence of conflicting circumstances or uses. Purist
notions of completely untrammeled, unblemished land have not been
sympathetically received. An important effect of this approach has been
to maximize the availability of lands, some of which may be minimally
impacted by a conflicting circumstance or use, for eventual wilderness
classification.
II. BREADTH OF WILDERNESS PROTECTION
The Wilderness Act is an extremely significant departure from his-
torical practices in the management of the nation's public lands. A pres-
ervation ethic rose to challenge the suzerainty of the traditional com-
modity interests, such as logging and mineral development. While envi-
ronmentally sensitive practices were gradually seeing more application
by 1964 and the Forest Service had begun an administrative process
designating its own wilderness and primitive areas, the Wilderness Act
marked a quantitative leap in the evolution of wilderness protection.
Over the next three decades, millions of acres came before Congress
for wilderness classification. In 1976, Congress brought Bureau of Land
Management lands, the huge remaining reservoir of unclassified public
lands, into the process through the enactment of the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976.2 Review and wilderness designation of
significant parts of our national parks and national wildlife refuges con-
tributed to the flow. A rapidly increasing population, enjoying the bene-
fits of an expanding economy and increased leisure time, flooded into
9. Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1007 (D. Utah 1979) (quoting the Wilderness Act §
2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994)) (emphasis added).
10. 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd in part, vacated in part, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir.
1985), affid in part, vacated in part, on reh'g, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
11. See Northwest Indian Cemetery, 565 F. Supp. at 603-04.
12. Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 603, 90 Stat. 2784, 2785 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1782
(1994)).
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many of the existing areas, producing a demand for more. This translated
into the political momentum which Congress needed to dedicate new
areas. And, this continues today.
Inevitably the scope and force of the Act were tested from the be-
ginning, as wilderness preservation clashed with the traditional com-
modity uses. Parker v. United States, involving timber sales and road
building, early resolved that Forest Service management of statutorily
mandated wilderness study areas could not include activities which
would destroy their wilderness character." In the words of the district
court, "it thwarts the purpose and spirit of the Act to allow the Forest
Service to take abortive action which effectively prevents a Presidential
and Congressional decision."'" The court of appeals agreed: "[B]oth the
President and the Congress shall have a meaningful opportunity to add
contiguous areas predominately of wilderness value to existing primitive
areas for final wilderness designation."' 6 The directive in section 3(b) of
the Act to review these contiguous areas amounted to "a 'proceed
slowly' order until it can be determined wherein the balance between
proper multiple uses of the wilderness lies and the most desirable and
highest use established for the present and the future.""
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt8 involved the wilderness
review provisions of FLPMA, governing public lands under the Bureau
of Land Management.'9 The court upheld the Department of the Interior
determination that mineral leasing activities not specifically grandfa-
thered under FLPMA would be regulated so as not to impair a wilderness
study area's suitability for wilderness.' In Getty Oil Co. v. Clark,2' the
court approved federal agency action suspending a proposed oil drilling
operation in a study area pending determination of impacts upon wilder-
ness values.'
Wilderness area designation includes a federal reserved water right.
Winters v. United States and Arizona v. California' established that
when Congress sets aside or reserves land from the public domain, such
reservation includes an implied right to a sufficient quantity of water
13. 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), aft'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971).
14. See Parker, 309 F. Supp. at 599.
15. Id.
16. Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1971).
17. Parker, 448 F.2d at 795.
18. 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982).
19. See Watt, 696 F.2d at 750.
20. See id.
21. 614 F. Supp. 904 (D. Wyo. 1985).
22. See Clark, 614 F. Supp. at 920.
23. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
24. 373 U.S. 544 (1953).
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needed to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.' Sierra Club v. Blocke
determined that the Wilderness Act established such a reserved water
right for wilderness areas." Moreover, the government must take steps to
protect this right and cannot escape its responsibility by obfuscation and
irresolute declarations.'
One court determined that the congressional direction to protect the
wilderness quality of wilderness areas overrides contrary sections of the
Act protecting preexisting private rights in the subsurface mineral
estate.' Although suggestive, this opinion stands by itself to date. The
fact that the case was decided on other grounds has probably contributed
to its apparent obscurity.
By no means have all cases been resolved in favor of wilderness.
Valid preexisting mining claims will be recognized and their appurtenant
rights protected." Road access will be allowed across wilderness study
lands to private interest or state lands although the route and mode of
access can be regulated.' In Sierra Club v. Hodel,3" widening a county
road even though it would impair an adjoining wilderness study area was
allowed, but it was limited to what was reasonable and necessary with
respect to preexisting uses.33  I
Furthermore, the land manager will have discretion to make the
close calls. Because the Wilderness Act allowed timber management in
the so-called "portal zone" of wilderness portions of the Boundary Wa-
ters Canoe Area, the Forest Service in Minnesota Public Research Group
v. Butz' had discretion to decide a management alternative, logging,
25. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (stating that "[tihe power of the government to reserve the
waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be"); see
also Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600 (following Winters). For an examination of federal reserved water rights
in wilderness areas, see Karin P. Sheldon, Waterfor Wilderness, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 555 (1999).
26. 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985).
27. See Block, 622 F. Supp. at 862 (holding that pursuant to the Wilderness Act, federally
reserved water rights exist "in previously unappropriated water"); see also Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661
F. Supp. 1490, 1495 (D. Colo. 1987) (noting the Solicitor General's findings that the Wilderness Act
does not eviscerate the implied reserved water rights doctrine), vacated sub nom., Sierra Club v.
Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1412 (10th Cir. 1990) (pointing out that the Forest Service acknowledges
the existence of federally reserved water rights under the Wilderness Act).
28. See Lyng, 661 F. Supp. at 1495 (holding that "Congress intended to continue the status quo
which allows for the creation and assertion of reserved water rights on lands withdrawn and reserved
under the Wilderness Act" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29. See lzaak Walton League of Am. v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698, 715 (D. Minn. 1973),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974).
30. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Robertson, 824 F. Supp. 947,951 (D. Mont. 1993).
31. See Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1009-10 (D. Utah 1979).
32. 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
33. See Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1084-85.
34. 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976).
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which would arguably cause more wilderness impairment than the plain-
tiffs' alternative, controlled burning."
A number of cases unsuccessfully tried to stretch the limits of the
Wilderness Act. Road construction and timber harvesting on land con-
tiguous to a wilderness study area would not be stopped.' Similarly, a ski
area expansion next to an area recommended for wilderness status by the
President was allowed to proceed.37 Land contiguous to a wilderness
study area where the existing primitive area and certain of its contiguous
lands had been studied and the whole had been submitted to the President
and Congress omitting the subject land, could be involved in a land ex-
change with a private interest.38
Two unusual cases tested the limits of the law. In Brown v. United
States Department of the Interior,9 the special mining provisions of the
Wilderness Act for Forest Service lands could not be stretched to allow
such activity in Buffalo National River managed by the National Park
Service. ' And, in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt," unilateral action of
a congressional committee could not prevent mineral leasing in the face
of statutory sections allowing leasing. 2
Obviously, the wilderness review process has been critical to the
eventual decisions of the President and Congress as to what lands would
be dedicated as wilderness areas. Much of this acreage was coveted by
private interests attracted to conflicting uses, such as logging and mining,
activities which had traditionally been allowed. The courts have adopted
a common sense approach, vigilantly protecting wilderness study areas
until the President and Congress make their decisions. However, land
outside the boundaries of formally designated wilderness study areas
does not enjoy such protection. Wilderness areas themselves enjoy the
full protection of the Wilderness Act, including reserved water rights, and
fmn application of the Act's imperatives to protect wilderness quality.
35. See Butz, 541 F.2d at 1295, 1301. For an examination of wilderness issues associated with
the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, see Richard A. Duncan & Kevin Proescholdt, Protecting the Bound-
ary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness: Litigation and Legislation, 76 DENv. U. L. REV. 621 (1999).
36. See Big Hole Ranchers Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 686 F. Supp. 256, 259-60 (D.
Mont. 1988); see also Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 124 (D. Alaska 1971) (holding that
"[s]ince there were no 'primitive' areas in Alaska on September 3, 1964, and it does not appear that
the sale includes any land within a national park, wildlife refuge or game range, the Wilderness Act
has no application").
37. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 751-53 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
38. See National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 343 F. Supp. 696 (D. Mont. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 485 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1973).
39. 679 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1982).
40. See Brown, 679 F.2d at 751.
41. 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981).
42. See Watt, 529 F. Supp. at 1005.
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III. MANAGING WILDERNESS
Today, questions of management of actual wilderness study areas
and designated wilderness predominate in the courts. The Wilderness Act
itself permits some conflicting activities in wilderness areas, while con-
gressional action placing an area within the wilderness system and under
the Wilderness Act's authority, sometimes blesses a particular local con-
flicting use. These contradictory signals have bred much litigation.
Section 5(b) of the Act allows access to valid mining claims within
wilderness areas "by means which have been or are being customarily
enjoyed with respect to other such areas similarly situated."'3 In Clouser
v. Espy," plaintiffs sought motorized access to claims in the Kalmiopsis
and North Fork John Day Wildernesses in Oregon."5 The Ninth Circuit
found that motorized access was not essential, that pack horses could
carry the appropriate equipment, and that this was feasible and custom-
arily done.' The court also noted that abandoned road tracks, now trails,
that the plaintiffs wished to use had been blocked by a gate for several
years, that the trails had not been maintained by the Forest Service, and
that "they [were] returning to a natural condition.' 7 Finally, the court
dismissed plaintiffs' argument that general mining laws of the United
States assured them motorized access, since the Wilderness Act specifi-
cally addressed the issue for wilderness areas.
On the other hand, in Voyageurs Region National Park Ass'n. v.
Lujan,4' where the enabling legislation allowed snowmobiling in the
park, snowmobiling would be allowed to continue in a wilderness study
area.' There was no showing that it would permanently change the area
and preclude its consideration for eventual wilderness status.,"
In Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Robertson,'2 the stat-
ute at issue addressed particular boat portages by name and directed the
Secretary of Agriculture to terminate motorized use, unless he deter-
mined that there was no nonmotorized means of transporting boats across
the portages." In reversing the district court decision approving the For-
est Service determination in favor of motorized access, the appellate
court noted that the evidence demonstrated successful use of portage
wheels, and that in a Forest Service test using different boats and people
of different age groups, twenty-six out of thirty-four teams completed
43. Wilderness Act § 5(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b) (1994).
44. 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994).
45. See Clouser, 42 F.3d at 1525.
46. See id. at 1536-37.
47. d at 1537.
48. See id. at 1538-39; see also Wilderness Act § 5(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b).
49. 966 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1992).
50. See Lujan, 966 F.2d at 427-28.
51. Cf. id at428.
52. 978 F.2d 1484 (8th Cir. 1992).
53. See Robertson, 978 F.2d at 1485.
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portages without motors.' In Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jensen,' com-
mercial fishing, although allowed by Glacier Bay National Park's ena-
bling legislation, was prohibited in the designated wilderness area por-
tions of the park under section 4(c) of the Act banning commercial enter-
prises in wilderness areas.'
A series of cases dealing with Forest Service attempts to control
outbreaks of the southern pine beetle in wilderness areas are very in-
structive. Section 4(d) of the Act authorizes the Forest Service to take
"such measures ... as may be necessary in the control of fire, insects,
and diseases, subject to such conditions as the Secretary [of Agriculture]
deems desirable."'7 Sierra Club v. Lynge allowed the Secretary to use
control measures, such as logging, so long as such measures were rea-
sonably designed to restrain or limit the spread of the infestation from
wilderness land to neighboring property to its detriment." Rigorous con-
ditions were placed upon this activity, which was only allowed where the
adjacent land owners were taking equally vigorous efforts and site spe-
cific determinations of specific outbreaks were required.'
Logging for other purposes could not be justified by the need to
control infestation. For example, cutting hardwoods would be prohibited,
because the pine beetle was not found in hardwoods." The method of
cutting the trees must be related to the objective of controlling the infes-
tation, and the use of natural barriers, such as rivers or hardwood stands
where present, may be required to control the beetles, rather than logging.'
Finally, the hard fought case of Stupak-Thrall v. United States" in-
volved the Sylvania Wilderness Area, which includes Crooked Lake with
most of its shoreline within the wilderness. The Forest Service promul-
gated regulations prohibiting the use of houseboats and sail boats and
discouraging the use of electronic fish finders, boom-boxes, and other
mechanized or battery operated devices.' The district court, whose
opinion is controlling here, found the regulations appropriate to preserve
54. See id. at 1485-89.
55. 108 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1997).
56. See Jensen, 108 F.3d at 1069 (citing Wilderness Act § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1994)).
57. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1).
58. 663 F. Supp. 556 (D.D.C. 1987).
59. See Lyng, 663 F. Supp. at 560.
60. See id.; see also Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D.D.C. 1987) (questioning
whether "adjacent properties can be equally well controlled against beetle infestation by measures
taken outside of the Wilderness Areas"); Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 488, 491-92 (D.D.C.
1985) (stating that "[i]f the cutting has a limited or no effect on the number of pine trees lost to
beetle infestations, wilderness area policy might be better served by no control").
61. Cf. Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 134, 139-40 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
62. Cf. Block, 614 F. Supp. at 140.
63. 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994), affd, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996).
64. See Stupak-Thrall, 843 F. Supp. at 328.
65. See id. at 334.
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the wilderness quality of the area. The court further found that the re-
strictions upon the plaintiffs' riparian uses of Crooked Lake, where there
was no historical use of sailboats and houseboats and the mechanical
devices were only discouraged, would only have a minimum impact
upon plaintiffs' riparian rights."
To a heartening degree, the federal courts have worked diligently to
protect wilderness values in wilderness areas and wilderness study areas.
Statutorily excepted uses have generally been put to a rigorous test to
assure that no more wilderness conflicting activity was allowed than that
necessary to honor the specific statutory language.
CONCLUSION
The Wilderness Act has dramatically impacted established uses of
millions of acres of public lands, uses that date back for generations. It
propounded an ethic of preservation of primitive lands, rather than con-
sumption, and instituted a process for their serious review and eventual
designation as wilderness areas. At the same time, bending a bit in ap-
parently necessary political adjustments to the traditional commodity
uses, Congress allowed conflicting activities under certain circumstances
within the very areas it protected.
It has taken strong action by the judiciary to strike the balances and
make the determinations that have ensured that qualifying lands were all
reviewed, and then, when formally dedicated as wilderness, protected.
The courts have succeeded by carefully scrutinizing the facts of the cases
brought before them and vigorously safeguarding wilderness principles
and lands. They have maintained balance and objectivity by recognizing
individual conflicting activities sanctioned by the Wilderness Act itself,
or by specific legislation establishing individual wilderness areas, where
petitioners have met their burden of showing they are clearly proceeding
according to a defined exception and are doing no more than necessary to
achieve that specific end.
66. See id.
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